A minor modification of the arguments of Press and Lightman leads to an estimate of the height of the tallest running, breathing organism on a habitable planet as the Bohr radius multiplied by the three-tenths power of the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces between two protons (rather than the one-quarter power that Press got for the largest animal that would not break in falling over, after making an assumption of unreasonable brittleness). My new estimate gives a height of (...) about 3.6 meters rather than Press’s original estimate of about 2.6 cm. It also implies that the number of atoms in the tallest runner is very roughly of the order of the nine-tenths power of the ratio of the electrical to gravitational forces between two protons, which is about 3×1032. (shrink)

D. N. MacCormick; XI*—The Obligation of Reparation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 175–194, https://doi.org/10.

D N Aspin; Church Schools, Religious Education and the Multi-ethnic Community, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 17, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 229–24.

Quantum mechanics may be formulated as Sensible Quantum Mechanics (SQM) so that it contains nothing probabilistic except conscious perceptions. Sets of these perceptions can be deterministically realized with measures given by expectation values of positive-operator-valued awareness operators. Ratios of the measures for these sets of perceptions can be interpreted as frequency- type probabilities for many actually existing sets. These probabilities gener- ally cannot be given by the ordinary quantum “probabilities” for a single set of alternatives. Probabilism, or ascribing probabilities to (...) unconscious aspects of the world, may be seen to be an aesthemamorphic myth. (shrink)

I review T. Ryan Byerly's treatment of the possible virtue of others-centeredness.

Inc.Q,., N.S. v , i76ff., Mr. A. E. Harvey discusses the problem presented by the first ten lines of the first column of the Berlin Papyrus of Corinna, and finds the solution in the region of erroneous colometry. So far as I can judge, he is justified in claiming that he has offered ‘the most concise and satisfactory explanation of the irregularities’; but, if so, there is one further step which should be taken, and there is one obscurity in his (...) account which should be clarified. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page 29-31, June 2011.

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 31, Issue 4, Page 904-922, October 2022.

Chez Hegel, la liberté ne dépend pas seulement de conditions historiques, politiques ou géographiques, mais aussi de conditions anthropologiques comme celle de l'âge : le degré de liberté dépend de l'âge qu'on a, la liberté ne vient pas avant l'âge ou le bon âge. Hegel développe une analyse parallèle des âges des peuples. Pourquoi la liberté a-t-elle pour condition l'âge de l'homme fait ? Est-ce la liberté du puissant face au jeune homme qui n'a pas le pouvoir et au vieillard (...) qui est affaibli ? Foucault, en commentant l'Alcibiade de Platon, a pu soutenir lui aussi l'idée d'un âge de la liberté : l'accès à soi permis par un âge critique de la vie conditionne surtout, dans le dialogue et pour Foucault, l'action et la pensée politiques. Revenant à Hegel, nous pouvons alors mieux comprendre que sa thèse de la plus grande liberté de l'homme fait ne dépend pas de sa puissance mais de l'exigence pratique et politique qui caractérise l'âge qui est le sien. In Hegelian philosophy, freedom is dependent not only on historical, political and geographical conditions, but also on anthropological conditions such as age. Our degree of freedom depends on how old we are, as freedom does not come before the right age. Hegel develops a parallel analysis of the ages of peoples. Why does freedom require the age of maturity as a necessary condition? Is it the consecration of the freedom of the powerful man against the young man, who has no power, and the old man, whose strength has waned? Commenting on Plato's Akibiades, Foucault also supports the idea of an age of freedom. In the dialogue and for Foucault, the access to oneself permitted by that critical age of life is notably the condition for political action and thought. Returning to Hegel, we can then better understand his thesis that greater freedom is that of maturity: it does not come from man's power but from the practical and political necessity that characterizes that particular age. (shrink)

Partant de l’analyse anthropologique des âges de la vie par Hegel dans l’Encyclopédie, on présentera sa critique des idéaux. Hegel fustige chez le jeune homme cette tendance à opposer le réel et l’idéal. Il dégage les risques à la fois individuels et collectifs que cette vision du monde fait courir et considère « l’homme fait » comme celui qui sait vouloir ce qui est. De cette analyse, suit la conclusion qu’il n’y a pas de possible en dehors du réel, pas (...) de substantialité hors du monde. Autrement dit, et contre la première impression de la plupart des hommes, possible et réel, devoir être et être, s’identifient. Pourtant, si l’aversion du réel inspirée par l’attachement aux idéaux représente, selon Hegel, un danger, le procès du devoir-être par la philosophie spéculative n’est pas non plus sans risque. Ne signe-t-il pas, comme le dira Nietzsche, la défaite de la volonté face au poids des choses ? La lecture, dans la Doctrine de l’essence, du chapitre intitulé « L’effectivité » dans la section du même nom, peut nous préserver de conclusions si déprimantes, car celui-ci vient expliquer, non que le possible est une chimère, une vue de l’esprit, mais qu’il s’identifie à l’effectif. Or, la reconnaissance de cette intimité produit d’une part en retour une conception plus riche, plus haute, plus noble du possible – elle lui donne en somme des lettres de noblesse – et, d’autre part, elle conduit à y lire une affirmation de la contingence. Notre argumentaire vise à établir qu’en disant que l’effectif est possible et que le possible est effectif, Hegel ne les détruit pas en leur ôtant leurs déterminations propres, mais leur assure une plus grande consistance. En étant possible, l’effectif cesse de se confondre avec la réalité comprise comme simple existence ou simple phénomène, comme simple il y a. En étant effectif, le possible cesse de signifier un moindre-être, un en deçà, un simplement ou seulement possible, puisqu’il est alors inscrit dans l’être, dans le monde. (shrink)

"L'irruption récente de la notion de "post-vérité", désignée comme mot de l'année 2016 par le dictionnaire d'Oxford, a suscité d'innombrables commentaires journalistiques, notamment sur le phénomène des fake news, mais peu de réflexions de fond. Or, cette notion ne concerne pas seulement les liens entre politique et vérité, elle brouille la distinction essentielle du vrai et du faux, portant atteinte à notre capacité à vivre ensemble dans un monde commun. En questionnant les rapports conflictuels entre politique et vérité, Myriam Revault (...) d'Allonnes déconstruit nombre d'approximations et de confusions. Elle montre que le problème majeur de la politique n'est pas celui de sa conformité à la vérité mais qu'il est lié à la constitution de l'opinion publique et à l'exercice du jugement. L'exploration du "régime de vérité" de la politique éclaire ce qui distingue fondamentalement les systèmes démocratiques, exposés en permanence à la dissolution des repères de la certitude, à la tentation du relativisme et à la transformation des "vérités de fait" en opinions, des systèmes totalitaires, où la toute-puissance de l'idéologie fabrique un monde entièrement fictif. Loin d'enrichir le monde, la "post-vérité" appauvrit l'imaginaire social et met en cause les jugements et les expériences sensibles que nous pouvons partager. Il est urgent de prendre conscience de la nature et de la portée du phénomène si nous voulons en conjurer les effets éthiques et politiques."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

La fiction historique dont nous parlons ici a vu le jour par rapport à la pensée de l'écriture, ou de l'inscription, telle qu'elle a eu lieu dans le travail de Jacques Derrida des années 60. Au coeur de ce travail, il y a trois textes publiés en 1967 : La voix et le phénomène, De la grammatologie, L'écriture et la différence. Traverser ces travaux revient à traverser : premièrement, l'imagination du mot, qui n'était pour Husserl que pure fiction ; deuxièmement, (...) l'imagination comme séparation de la nature dans la nature chez Rousseau ; et troisièmement, la fiction comme imaginaire dans le cas du structuralisme littéraire, au-delà duquel a lieu la fiction sans imaginaire de Mallarmé. Juste avant ces travaux il y a, dans l'oeuvre publiée, le moment où la fiction historique commence à percer ; juste après, le moment où ses fondements ont déjà été établis : l''Introduction' à L'Origine de la géométrie de Husserl et 'La double séance' dans La dissémination, respectivement. C'est également l'espace compris entre le problème de l'historicité et celui d'une littérature sans condition. À cet espace appartient la possibilité de 'devenir une chose littéraire' de tout texte 'confié à l'espace public [...] dont le contenu, le sens, le référent, le signataire et le destinataire ne sont pas des réalités pleinement déterminables, des réalités à la fois non-fictives ou pures de toute fiction...' (Donner la mort)."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

"Cet ouvrage collectif présente le dialogue entre de jeunes chercheurs en phénoménologie et Alexander Schnell, phénoménologue contemporain ; à partir de son ouvrage paru en 2020, Le Clignotement de l'être. Il défend la vivacité de la phénoménologie transcendantale aujourd'hui, en tant que méthode philosophique qui interroge les secrets de la subjectivité et son rapport à la réalité, au fil conducteur des concepts d'intentionnalité, de réduction, de générativité, d'absolu, et d'histoire. La question directrice qui rassemble les contributions réunies ici est la (...) suivante : quand le phénoménologue effectue la réduction phénoménologique et fait l'expérience du transcendantal comme tel, à quelle réalité fait-il face?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Nul n'est plus fuyant que le mauvais goût. Qu'il soit relatif, ancré dans son temps, frontière sociale ou revendiqué tel une profession de foi artistique. Dans ce Dictionnaire amoureux intime et partial, Nicolas d'Estienne d'Orves vous invite dans son grenier braillard et cocasse. 'Le mauvais goût échappe à toute définition, famille ou clan. Tout comme le bon goût, il est relatif, circonstanciel, ancré dans son temps. Il peut également être une frontière sociale, un racisme de classe. En ce cas, le (...) mauvais goût c'est celui de l'autre, celui qu'on n'a pas et qu'on se défend d'avoir au risque de trahir les siens. Enfin il y a le mauvais goût patenté, revendiqué, qui n'est pas une attitude, une mode, mais une profession de foi artistique, un manifeste esthétique. C'est -sans doute- ce qu'on pourrait appeler le kitsch. C'est-à-dire un style en soi, des formes volontaires, pensées, destinées à déranger la norme. Ce livre sera donc, par essence, partial. Avec le mauvais goût, j'entre dans une zone marécageuse. Est-il possible de faire un livre plus intime, plus narcissique, puisqu'il explore la part d'ombre de ma propre sensibilité? Petit enfant sous Giscard, adolescent sous Mitterrand, j'ai pris racine dans des époques aux esthétiques très contrastées qui seront forcément présentes dans ces pages. Souvenirs intimes, émissions de télévision, films, livres, plats, commerces, personnages imaginaires ou pas, attitudes de tous poils, mon mauvais goût est une auberge qui n'a rien d'espagnole mais tout d'un grenier. Un grenier braillard et cocasse, que j'ai moi-même tenté de ranger pour les besoins de la cause. Le mauvais goût ne se partage pas, en ce qu'il est une exploration de nos propres frontières esthétiques, la ligne de crête entre ce que l'on goûte et ce que l'on recrache. Bienvenue dans mon train fantôme!'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Westphal wished to transpose lines 88–90 and 93–5 of the Supplices. This transposition has been supported recently by R. D. Dawe , by Holger Friis Johansen in C. & M. xxvii , 43–4 , and by Sir Denys Page . However, the transposition gains little support from a careful examination of the language and context of the passage, as I shall now proceed to demonstrate. I discussed the whole passage previously in my article ‘Aeschylus Supplices 86–95’, Classical Philology, 1 (...) , 21–5, and much of my argument can be found in that earlier article. (shrink)

Over recent years, the research community has been increasingly using preprint servers to share manuscripts that are not yet peer-reviewed. Even if it enables quick dissemination of research findings, this practice raises several challenges in publication ethics and integrity. In particular, preprints have become an important source of information for stakeholders interested in COVID19 research developments, including traditional media, social media, and policy makers. Despite caveats about their nature, many users can still confuse pre-prints with peer-reviewed manuscripts. If unconfirmed but (...) already widely shared first-draft results later prove wrong or misinterpreted, it can be very difficult to “unlearn” what we thought was true. Complexity further increases if unconfirmed findings have been used to inform guidelines. To help achieve a balance between early access to research findings and its negative consequences, we formulated five recommendations: (a) consensus should be sought on a term clearer than ‘pre-print’, such as ‘Unrefereed manuscript’, “Manuscript awaiting peer review” or ‘’Non-reviewed manuscript”; (b) Caveats about unrefereed manuscripts should be prominent on their first page, and each page should include a red watermark stating ‘Caution—Not Peer Reviewed’; (c) pre-print authors should certify that their manuscript will be submitted to a peer-review journal, and should regularly update the manuscript status; (d) high level consultations should be convened, to formulate clear principles and policies for the publication and dissemination of non-peer reviewed research results; (e) in the longer term, an international initiative to certify servers that comply with good practices could be envisaged. (shrink)

Dans les premiers chants de l’ Enfer, Dante déclare entre les lignes la tâche à laquelle il se sent appelé en tant que « poète chrétien » : d’un côté, il est invité à argumenter avec la rigueur du discours scientifique les vérités fondamentales de la religion ; de l’autre côté, il lui est confié la charge d’entraîner le lecteur dans une lecture anagogique de ces vérités en recourant aux fascinations allégoriques de la poésie. En accomplissant cette mission, Dante obtiendra, (...) pour lui-même et pour les autres êtres humains, cette perfection anthropologique naturelle qui culmine, après la mort terrestre, par le retour aux conditions métaphysiques qui se seraient actualisées en la personne d’Adam s’il n’avait pas péché. Cette conception est déjà opérante dans certaines pages de la Vie nouvelle et du Banquet, mais c’est surtout dans La Divine Comédie que Dante en revient spontanément à ce genre de techniques sur un mode original et particulièrement efficace. On en a un exemple éclairant quand, au Chant III de l’ Enfer, la poésie décrit le tourbillon, apparemment disharmonieux et dépourvu de sens, des sons qui émergent de la cavité infernale, en se basant non seulement sur l’application évidente d’au moins deux artifices rhétoriques déterminés, mais surtout sur l’évocation formellement rigoureuse des règles de la dialectique (selon la terminologie en usage dans les écoles) : le succès de cette opération dépend de la capacité, de la part du lecteur, de retrouver la signification authentique de la terminologie scientifique mise en œuvre en poésie, utilisée pour illustrer les vérités de la foi et la nouvelle beauté de la synthèse entre art poétique et disciplines du Trivium. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject by Denis DŽANIĆD. J. HobbsDŽANIĆ, Denis. Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility: Husserl and Fink on the Phenomenologizing Subject. Cham: Springer, 2023. x + 236 pp. Cloth, $119.99Denis Džanić’s Transcendental Phenomenology as Human Possibility, despite its superficially historical focus on a specific period of collaboration between Edmund Husserl and his somewhat wayward protégé Eugen Fink, addresses key (...) systematic issues in transcendental phenomenology, namely, how the act of phenomenologizing should be understood in connection with the specific human beings who aim to become phenomenologists, and what the answer to this question tells us about both the genuine subject of phenomenology and the motivation for phenomenologizing. These questions are important for our understanding of not only the historical development of phenomenology but also the practice and goals of phenomenology—specifically, for a conception of phenomenologizing as a project in which we, as particular, historical, empirical figures, might want to engage.Much of the book focuses on laying the groundwork for understanding these complicated issues both historically and systematically. Džanić does an admirable job of tracing the rapidly evolving interactions between Husserl and Fink, both as intellectual collaborators on this philosophical project and as a pair of very human figures who ultimately found themselves pursuing quite different solutions to the problems of the subject and origin of phenomenology. He focuses particularly on the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, Fink’s attempt to extend Husserl’s famous text to include a phenomenology of the act of phenomenologizing itself (including Husserl’s marginal comments on the text), although he draws on a number of other significant texts and manuscripts (mostly Husserl’s, albeit with an extended aside on Heidegger) wherever they are helpful for explicating the complex evolution of Husserl’s thought on the subject. Admittedly, the book thus takes on a challenging task—both because of the difficult nature of this topic and because of the obscurity of the technical terms required to discuss it. However, despite the necessarily enigmatic character of the relevant language, Džanić’s attempts to explore the main outlines of this issue are worthwhile, particularly due to his ability to resist the temptation to view Husserl’s thought here as monolithic.In the early chapters, Džanić explicates in detail the rather complicated solution that Fink proposed to this difficulty, namely, the abandonment (to some extent) of the ultimately human origin of phenomenology in favor of a fundamentally nonhuman (and eventually meontic) conception of the transcendental ego, which generated a great deal of elaborate and (at least in the Sixth Meditation) inadequately supported speculation. For Fink, both the motivation to phenomenologize and the act of phenomenologizing itself ultimately stem from a source that is fundamentally prior to—in a(n onto)logical rather than temporal sense—any empirical ego or empirical act of phenomenologizing, a source that merely “enworlds” itself (in various complicated senses that Džanić does [End Page 145] an admirable job of clarifying) in the apparently anthropologistic, everyday world of individual phenomenologists. Džanić calls this interpretation of phenomenology Fink’s “epistemological anti-humanism,” and it serves as the basis for one potential (radically anti-Heideggerian but nevertheless somewhat disappointing) solution to the question of why we should phenomenologize at all. As Džanić notes, this solution was at least briefly taken up by Fink’s mentor Husserl himself, although the degree to which Husserl actually endorsed this path beyond the level of a fleeting flirtation remains questionable. Ultimately, as Džanić rightly highlights and as becomes abundantly clear in Husserl’s (often rather scathing) notes on Fink’s Sixth Cartesian Meditation, he abandoned this interpretation.Accordingly, in the later chapters of the book, Džanić traces Husserl’s ultimate development of a quite different solution to the problems of the origin and motivation of phenomenology—a solution that, unlike his brief foray into Finkian grandeur, views the act of phenomenologizing as essentially rooted in human possibility (that is, as part of the famous lifeworld that features so prominently in Husserl’s work, especially in the Crisis and other late texts). After his collaboration with and... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 31.4 (2001) 54-82 [Access article in PDF] Seeing With The Body The Digital Image In Postphotography Mark B. N. Hansen In a well-known scene from the 1982 Ridley Scott film Bladerunner, Rick Deckard scans a photograph into a 3-D rendering machine and directs the machine to explore the space condensed in the two-dimensional photograph as if it were three-dimensional [see fig. 1]. Following Deckard's commands to zoom in (...) and to pan right and left within the image space, the machine unpacks the "real" three-dimensional world represented by the two-dimensional photograph [see figs. 2-3]. After catching a glimpse of his target—a fugitive replicant—reflected from a mirror within the space, Deckard instructs the machine to move around behind the object obstructing the two-dimensional photographic view of the replicant and to frame what it sees [see figs. 4-5]. Responding to the print command issued by Deckard, the machine dispenses a photograph of the replicant which is, quite literally, a close-up of an invisible—indeed nonexistent—part of the two-dimensional original [see fig. 6]. And yet, following the fantasy of this scene, this impossible photograph is—or would be—simply the image of one particular data point within the data set comprising this three-dimensional data space. As fascinating as it is puzzling, this scene of an impossible rendering—a rendering of two-dimensional data as a three-dimensional space—can be related to the crisis brought to photography by digitization in two ways. On the one hand, in line with the film's thematic questioning of photography as a reliable index of memory, this scene foregrounds the technical capacity of digital processing to manipulate photographs. In this way, it thematizes the threat posed by digital technologies to traditional indexical notions of photographic realism. On the other hand, in what has turned out to be a far more prophetic vein, the scene presents a radically new understanding of the photographic image as a three-dimensional "virtual" space. Such an understanding presupposes a vastly different material existence of the photographic image: instead of a physical inscription of light on sensitive paper, the photograph has become a data set that can be rendered in various ways and thus viewed from various perspectives.The first position corresponds to the arguments made by William Mitchell in his now classic book, The Reconfigured Eye. In a comprehensive analysis of the techniques and possibilities of digital imaging, Mitchell concentrates on demarcating the traditional photographic image from its digital doppelgänger. While the specter of manipulation has always haunted the photographic image, it remains the exception rather than the rule: "There is no doubt that extensive reworking of photographic images to produce seamless transformations and combinations is technically difficult, time-consuming, and outside the mainstream of photographic practice. When we look at photographs we presume, unless we have some clear indications to the contrary, that they have not been reworked" [Mitchell 7]. To buttress this claim, Mitchell sketches three criteria for evaluating traditional photographic images: (1) does the image follow the conventions of photography and seem internally coherent? (2) does the visual evidence it presents [End Page 54]Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="33" />Click for larger viewFigure 1Still from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space.Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="32" />Click for larger viewFigure 2Still from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space.Stills from Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982), courtesy of Warner Brothers Home Video. Rick Deckard navigates a two-dimensional image as a three-dimensional space." width="72" height="33" />Click... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Metamorphosis of Language in Apuleius: A Study of Allusion in the NovelGerald SandyEllen D. Finkelpearl. Metamorphosis of Language in Apuleius: A Study of Allusion in the Novel. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. xii 1 241 pp. Cloth, $42.50.At first glance the use of the word “allusion” in the subtitle of this book suggests an old-fashioned approach to literary analysis. Finkelpearl has, however, given a lot of (...) thought to her choice of terms. She acknowledges the equivocalness of allusions but prefers to use this word for the process of incorporating material from earlier writers rather than “reference” or “intertextuality.” In spite of her somewhat informal description of the process of allusion (“recalling, modifying, transforming, and playing around with passages”), she has made a conscientious effort to circumvent the “fuzziness and inexactitude” of identifying allusions by making vigorous use of TLL and other traditional philological aids in order to isolate words, phrases, and lexical combinations that are unique to Apuleius and his putative sources. She has also deliberately avoided applying a single theoretical model, because “Apuleius draws on a wide variety of genres from different time periods,... use[s] his sources differently at different times [and]... often maintains an ambiguous stance—between rejection and incorporation, homage and polemic—even within single allusions” (24). This “ambiguous stance” is in fact central to the thesis that Finkelpearl consistently develops in her book: In the Metamorphoses, “allusion provides a medium [End Page 471] for exploration of the fit between the novel and the genres it contains and helps the novel toward a definition of its genre” (27). She emphasizes the ambiguity of her subject from the beginning to the end of her book, stating in chapter 1 that her aim is “to examine the multiplicity of interactions between the Apuleian text and its forebears, with a vigilant consciousness of the novel’s various uncertainties” (31) and concluding that she has focused on the tensions caused by situating “an uncertain genre” within a defined literary tradition.There is no uncertainty about the structure of the book. Each of the eight chapters begins with a survey of relevant scholarship and a declaration of Finkelpearl’s place within, or outside of, the range of summarized views. The sequence of chapters also unfolds logically. After surveying in chapter 1 (“Background and Method”) the various scholarly procedures that have been used to characterize allusions, she progresses from the seemingly most simple (parody) to the most complex practices of allusion. One of the strongest features of the book is that she manages to uncover complex patterns of allusion in passages that other scholars have been content to label parodies. Good examples of this resourcefulness occur in Finkelpearl’s examination of Apuleius’ use of Sallust, one of the canonical Latin archaic models during the second half of the second century. At 1.16.2–3 the “low-life character” Aristomenes makes an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide by hanging himself with a rope attached to his bed. He addresses the bed in the words spoken by Adherbal over the corpse of his brother Hiempsal (BJ 14.22), substituting, however, grabattule for frater. Other scholars have commented on the obvious disparity between the dignified poignancy of the passage in Sallust and the low-life melodrama of the Apuleian revamping of it. Finkelpearl explains that “the choice of reference has relevance beyond its comic effect” (51), for Aristomenes’ words are “motivated by the questions posed... [by Adherbal] about life and death in the face of fratricide and injustice.” As she puts it, “Apuleius never merely defaces or satirizes; examination of his text reveals a complex thematic engagement with his sources.”In chapter 3 (“Reading Isolated Allusions”) Finkelpearl also manages to find overarching resonance in seemingly isolated pastiches. Others, including me, have perhaps been too quick to conclude that Lucius’ prolonged praise of the maidservant Fotis’ hair in book 2 of the novel is an empty piece of the type of rhetorical tour de force that characterizes the Second Sophistic. Finkelpearl argues, however, that hairstyle and other styles of appearance and dress can serve in the Augustan poets as emblems of literary doctrine and that Apuleius... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Global Empires and The Roman ImperiumBrent D. ShawP. Fibiger Bang, C. A. Bayly, and W. Scheidel, eds. The Oxford World History of Empire. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021; xxviii + 552 pp.; xxxiv + 1,318 pp.The volumes under review are an impressive if unequal diptych. The first, the slimmer of the two, entitled "The Imperial Experience," comprises a series of analytical studies on the creation, management, and (...) ideologies of empires, and forms of resistance to them. The second, "The History of Empires," is a forbidding tome of forty-four specific studies of individual empires and imperial ventures, from Ur III and Middle Kingdom Egypt to the Mongols and the British, ending, naturally, with America's "global imperium." In the analytics, the usual suspects, including Michael Doyle, Frederick Cooper and Jane Burbank, are on display; and the conceptual approaches of Michael Mann and Ernest Gellner are favorite points d'appui. For premodern empires, the ideas of the Maghribi thinker Ibn Khaldūn provide a different focus, so it is heartening to see Bang and others applying them more consistently (e.g., 1:13, 40, 326–9; 2:162, 246–8, 253). Especially for premodern empires, these volumes can be seen as an extension of earlier handbooks devoted to the state, one devoted to the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean state and another on ancient empires.1 As an aspect of world history, the endeavor is the culmination of a decades-long project on the history of empires fronted by Peter Bang.2 He has usefully produced detailed historical introductions not only to both volumes, but also to the subsections in each of them. Perhaps not surprisingly, empire turns out to be a virile enterprise. As Ian Morris notes, "the story of empire... is so strongly gendered that it [End Page 505] seems reasonable to call rulers and commanders 'he' throughout" (1:162 n. 14). The muscular subject is mirrored by its principal actors and by its students. All the editors are men. Reflecting the same balance, out of the forty-five authors of individual studies in the large history of empires volume, there are five (lonely) female voices. In both volumes, women as subjects of empire are, for all intents and purposes, absent.3From the perspective of an historian who has actually worked on the history of an empire, it must be plainly stated that almost all of the theories, adequately reviewed by Bang (1:20–48), are worth about as much as the paper or pixilated screens on which they have been written. Obvious and serious exceptions to every one of the definitions and hypotheticals abound. In fact, a fair number of the exemplary histories in the second volume do not obey the strictures of most of the theories advanced in the first. So it is with a sense of relief that one turns from theory to the hard quantities offered by Walter Scheidel (1:chap. 2). To a considerable degree, his analysis depends on the well-known measurements made by Rein Taagepera. Rather alarmingly, Taagepera counted as an empire "any large sovereign political entity whose components are not sovereign," say, like the well-known empires of Algeria, Finland, or Canada.4 What an analysis of these global entities confirms is that size or orders of magnitude mattered, and that the first entities to count as empires emerged in the 7th to 5th centuries bce in southwestern Asia (1:53; 2:161, 245). The neo-Assyrian empire was the first super-large territorial state and its successor, the Achaemenid empire, was the first "hyper-power without rival" (1:172; 2:83, 111, 161). Subsequent premodern empires were able to reach higher levels of millions of square kilometers of territory and larger populations of dozens of millions of subjects nominally under their aegis. The magnitudes reached by a given generation of super-states set base-lines above which a successor might be able to reach greater sophistication of rule, numbers of subjects, and extent of territory. In some cases, being able to piggy-back on existing empires, they were able to skip early developmental stages and to advance quickly to imperial status, as a succession... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Moral Motivation and the Development of Francis Hutcheson’s PhilosophyJohn D. BishopHutcheson was an able philosopher, but philosophical analysis was not his only purpose in writing about morals. 1 Throughout his life his writings aimed at promoting virtue; his changing philosophical views often had to conform, if he could make them, to that rhetorical end. But a mind which understands philosophical argument cannot always control the conclusions at which it (...) arrives. The result for Hutcheson was often tension in his thought—which in the end produced a farrago when he tried to create a system of moral philosophy.Throughout his writing career, Hutcheson’s views on the problem of moral motivation were a combination of change and development against a background of certain constant views. A close examination of his views on moral motivation throws light on the development of his thought, including his growing Stoicism, and some of the changes he made to the moral sense theory.The phrase “moral motivation” can refer to either of two issues. On the one hand there is the question of what motivates virtuous actions, and the usual answer for Hutcheson is benevolence. Because they are approved by the moral sense, actions motivated by benevolence are morally good or virtuous (terms which I will use interchangeably). Hutcheson in his late writings calls such actions “formally good” to distinguish them from actions which do in fact promote the greatest happiness, or the natural good, of others; these latter actions are “materially good.” 2 On the other hand there is [End Page 277] the question of how our knowledge of the virtuousness of certain actions can motivate and how in particular such knowledge can motivate morally good actions. For Hutcheson we know which actions are morally good because we have a moral sense, but how this knowledge motivates morally good actions is a question Hutcheson made several attempts to answer. This second question, how the moral sense can motivate morally good actions, is the focus of this paper. The development of Hutcheson’s idea of benevolence will be commented on briefly, but first we need to look at some of the unchanging aspects of Hutcheson’s thought and purposes to provide background to the issue of motivation.Virtuous actions are the result of virtuous character. Hutcheson maintained this from his earliest publications (Reflections, par. 5) to his posthumous System. 3 A virtuous character cannot be directly chosen, even if we wanted to, because we cannot choose to have benevolent desires: “[N]either benevolence nor any other affection or desire can be directly raised by volition” (Inquiry, IV, 139; revised from first edition).But virtue can be cultivated:... virtue, itself, or good dispositions of mind, are not directly taught, or produced by instruction; they must be originally planted in our nature by its great Author, and afterwards strengthened and confirmed by our own cultivation.(Inquiry, IV, 271. Changed from I, 253, with reference to cultivation added; cf. also Introduction, 13, 25, 38, 39, 58–59, etc.)We can cultivate virtue in ourselves; and through writing, teaching, conversation, and social interaction, we can cultivate it in others. 4 At the start of his career, when announcing in Reflections the purpose of his writing on [End Page 278] moral theory, Hutcheson regrets that the moral systems common in his day are not conducive to promoting virtue: they are written, he says, by moralists who are “sour and morose in their deportment;... easily put out of humour...; dejected with common calamities, and insolent upon any prosperous change in fortune” (Reflections, par. 4). He promises that his forthcoming Inquiry will not have this fault. In the preface to the Essay he complains about the writings of the ethical egoists because “many [people] have been discouraged from all attempts of cultivating kind generous affections in themselves, by a previous notion that there are no such affections in nature...” (I, v; III, v). Throughout all the rest of his writings on morality Hutcheson advocates both the private and communal cultivation of virtue, and at the same time he contributes to that cultivation.The other constant which dominates the moral motivation issue is Hutcheson’s rejection of egoism. Benevolence is a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Origins and Evolution of Bioethics: Some Personal ReflectionsEdmund D. Pellegrino (bio)AbstractBioethics was officially baptized in 1972, but its birth took place a decade or so before that date. Since its birth, what is known today as bioethics has undergone a complex conceptual metamorphosis. This essay loosely divides that metamorphosis into three stages: an educational, an ethical, and a global stage. In the educational era, bioethics focused on a (...) perceived “dehumanization” of medicine by the rising power of science and technology. Remedies were sought by introducing humanities, ethics, and human “values” into the medical curriculum. Ethics was one among the humanistic disciplines, but not the dominant one. In the second era, ethics assumed a dominant role as ever more complex dilemmas emerged from the rapid pace of biological research. As such dilemmas were applied to medical practice, the need for a more rigorous and more formal analysis of their moral status was clear. Philosophically-trained ethicists had an obvious role. They began to teach, write, and profoundly influence medical education and practice. In the third—and present—period, the breadth of problems has become so broad that ethicists must, themselves, draw on disciplines well beyond their expertise—e.g., law, religion, anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and the like. The era of bioethics as a global enterprise is upon us. The original hope for humanizing medicine has not been overtly successful; however, much has been accomplished of value to patients, the profession, and society. Medical morality has been transformed into a formal, systematic study of a whole range of issues of the greatest significance to humanity. Now the major challenge is one of identity, or inter-relationships and connections between the theoretical and the practical. Bioethics has outgrown its beginnings.I have been invited to give a “personal recollection” of the early development of bioethics. Such invitations are notoriously hard to resist, but also problematic when they are the recollections of a participant [End Page 73] in the events to be described. We need only be reminded of the vagaries common to the plethora of memoirs on the book stands today. Few have escaped the perils of selective memory, self-promotion, or the settling of old scores. Yet their perils notwithstanding, memoirs may serve some useful purpose. They are the raw material—verbal kitchen middens so to speak—out of which historians can later sift fact from fancy. They enable “tribal elders” to give witness to the past from which the present can fashion some sense of continuity.I will organize my reflections around three very arbitrary time periods that represent my own way of thinking about the evolution of bioethics: (1) an era of “proto-bioethics” (1960–1972), (2) an era of philosophical bioethics (1972–1985), and (3) an era of global bioethics (1985-present). Each era, of course, overlaps with the others, and the dominant strand of each runs through the others as well.In the proto-bioethics period, the language of human values predominated; in the era of bioethics philosophically construed, it was the language of philosophical ethics; and in the era of bioethics globally construed, the social and behavioral sciences have gained greater prominence. In each period, interest in the traditional humanities other than philosophy waxed and waned. In the earlier years, religion and theology predominated. Beginning in the 1970s, philosophy took a dominant role. In the last two decades, other disciplines, like law, literature, and the social sciences, have exerted more and more influence (McNeur 1963; Pellegrino 1997; Barker 1987).I make no pretense here of writing any part of the formal “history” of bioethics. Works of this nature are beginning to appear (Rothman 1991; Jonsen 1998 ; Dell’Oro and Viafora 1996). Thomas McElhinney and I are preparing our own account of the work and influence of the Institute on Human Values in Medicine, one of the influential programs of the Society for Health and Human Values (Pellegrino and McElhinney, n.d.). Space limitations as well as prudence preclude any attempt to do justice to all the events, institutions, and people who have made the field of bioethics what it is today. I apologize for these omissions, for any unintentional lapses of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RECENT BARTHIANA 1 JOHN D. GODSEY Wesley Theological Seminary Washington, D.C. N 0 ONE CAN responsibly do theology today without reckoning with the prodigious legacy of Karl Barth, the Swiss Reformed theologian who was born in 1886, began theological studies in 1904, entered a full-time pastorate in 1911, taught dogmatics successively at Gottingen, Munster, Bonn, and Basel between 1921 and 1962, and died in 1968. From his electrifying Commentary (...) on Romans through his multivolumed but unfinished Church Dogmatics he wrote unceasingly in the areas of exegetical, historical, ethical, practical, and dogmatic theology, and ventured from time to time into the realms of politics and culture. Helper in organizing textile workers while pastor in Safenwil, questioner of major assumptions of neoProtestant liberal theology, spiritual leader of the German Confessing Church's struggle against Nazism, principal author of the Barmen Confession, participant in the 1948 Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches, and invited guest of Pope Paul VI in Rome in 1966-these are some of the highlights of Barth's colorful career. The books under review provide impressive testimony to Barth's ongoing significance for modern theology. One is a work 1 Karl Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, vol. I, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Eerdmans, 1991). 490 pp. $39.95 cloth. George Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (Oxford Univ. Press, 1991). 298 pp. $32.50 cloth. John Macken, S.J., The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics: Karl Barth and his Critics (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990). 232 pp. $54.50 cloth. S. W. Sykes, ed., Karl Barth: Centenary Essays (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989). 171 pp. $39.50 cloth. 269 270 JOHN D. GODSEY by Barth himself, two grew out of doctoral dissertations, and the other contains interpretative essays by five theologians who wished to honor Barth on the occasion of his centenary year in 1986. To appreciate properly the surprising appearance of Barth's Gottingen Dogmatics requires a bit of history. After ten years as a pastor in the village of Safenwil in north-central Switzerland, Barth was called in 1921 to be "Honorary Professor of Reformed Theology" on the theological faculty of the University of Gottingen in Germany. Having neither doctorate nor teaching experience, he was offered the cp_air on the basis of the first edition of Romans ( 1919) with the expectation that he would represent the Reformed tradition in this German Lutheran stronghold. During his first years he presented exegetical lectures on biblical texts as well as historical lectures that would help him learn his own tradition: the Heidelberg Catechism, Calvin, Zwingli, the Reformed Confessions, and Schleiermacher. Not until 1924-25 did he dare attempt to lecture on dogmatics, and even then he was not allowed to use the title "dogmatics," which was reserved strictly for Lutherans, so he chose to name his lecture series " Instruction in the Christian Religion," recalling Calvin's chief work, Institutio religionis christianae. Unlike his second cycle of lectures in Munster in 1926 (published as Prolegomena to Die Christliche Dogmatik in 1927) and the magisterial Church Dogmatics that began in 1932, these first lectures on dogmatics were never published during Barth's life time. Preserved in his own handwriting, they were edited and finally made public in 1990 in the Swiss edition of his Collected Works. The first of two volumes has now appeared in English and comprises four of seven chapters : three on the doctrine of the Word of God (as Revelation, as Holy Scripture, and as Christian Preaching) plus one on the doctrine of God. Three other major loci (Anthropology, Reconciliation, and Redemption) will appear in Volume Two. Professor Daniel L. Migliore of Princeton Seminary has written a 48-page Introduction to the whole, which provides brilliant insights into Barth's theology and points RECENT BARTHIANA 271 out the particular characteristics and peculiarities of this first (and only completed!) set of lectures on dogmatics. Why should one read the Gottingen Dogmatics rather than, say, the Church Dogmatics? First, Barth's basic theology, at least the lineaments thereof, is to be found here in what is perhaps its most accessible form; in relatively short compass he sets forth his... (shrink)

Le progrès choisit ses projets d'avenir parmi les théories générales du futur. L'idéologie politique en est une mais pour réaliser son objectif de pouvoir, elle revendique d'être une pensée générale et totale. Elle crée une identité idéologique à laquelle le citoyen peut adhérer. Pourtant, l'idée du vivre-ensemble signifie aussi que les hommes sont différents mais semblables ; leurs identités idéologiques peuvent s'opposer. Dans ces conditions, l'idéologie voudrait bien subvertir l'idéal d'une éthique universelle pour épurer la pensée, dire la norme du (...) bien, du mal et du pur, et séparer l'ami et l'ennemi. Ce mécanisme relève de la psychologie politique. Les identités individuelle et collective sont liées par le même mécanisme du narcissisme. Le narcissisme primaire et secondaire est à l'origine de l'individualité et de l'altérité sociale. Le narcissisme tertiaire arrivé à maturité sera la source de la solidarité, de l'altruisme puis de la formation de l'éthique. C'est à cette dernière phase que l'identité collective est en balance entre accomplir son idéal idéologique activiste et unanimiste ou bien travailler des idéaux universels complexes pour une même humanité riche de ses cultures et de ses civilisations variées"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Les canevas de conférences sont à l'œuvre de Gustave Thibon ce que les esquisses sont aux toiles ou aux sculptures des artistes : souvent conçues comme simples outils de travail, elles survivent, par leur valeur intrinsèque, à leur emploi. Ainsi des textes que nous proposons ici aux lecteurs : Gustave Thibon ne les a écrits que pour lui-même, à seule fin d'affermir son discours lorsqu'il parlait en public. Précaution utile, car il improvisait beaucoup... Mais de même que la nudité du (...) trait, s'il est juste, fait ressortir le pouvoir miraculeux de la main, le dépouillement de la phrase accusera ici celui de l'intelligence. Et Gustave Thibon a l'intelligence contagieuse! Il nous donne de comprendre tout ce qu'il nous donne à comprendre. On remarquera qu'ici, où il n'est guère question que de sujets "terre à terre", sociaux ou politiques, Gustave Thibon emploie, certes, son légendaire bon sens à la juste exposition des problèmes, à la claire formulation des questions (ce qui relève d'une sorte de bon sens inspiré qui n'a vraiment rien de commun avec le gros bon sens ordinaire) mais qu'en revanche, il n'entrevoit jamais l'ombre d'une solution qui n'exige de la part des hommes un minimum d'ouverture à une autre dimension - une dimension spirituelle, religieuse, hors de laquelle tout se complique à l'infini, rien ne peut être dénoué."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone PatreD. S. PotterTranslated by Cynthia DamonEditorial Conventions( ) expansion of abbreviation[ ] restoration of letters written but now missing{ } deletion of letters written by mistake[ ] correction of letters considered wrongly inscribed necessary supplements > in translation, material supplied for clarity1 A(nte) d(iem) IIII eid(us) Dec(embres) in Palatio in porticu, quae est ad Apollinis. Scribendo2 adfuerunt M(arcus) Valerius M(arci) f(ilius) Lem(onia tribu) (...) Messallinus, G(aius) Ateius L(uci) f(ilius) Ani(ensi tribu) Capito, Sex(tus) Pomp(eius)3 Sex(ti) f(ilius) Arn(ensi tribu), M(arcus) Pompeius M(arci) f(ilius) Teret(ina tribu) Priscus, G(aius) Arrenus G(ai) f(ilius) Gal(eria tribu) Gallus, L(ucius) Nonius L(uci) f(ilius)4 Pom(ptina tribu) Asprenas q(uaestor), M(arcus) Vinicius P(ubli) f(ilius) Pob(lilia tribu) q(uaestor). vacat Quod Ti(berius) Caesar divi Aug(usti) f(ilius) Aug(ustus)5 pontifex maxumus, tribunicia potestate XXII, co(n)s(ul) III, designatus IIII ad sena– tum rettulit qualis causa Cn. Pisonis patris visa esset et an merito sibi mor– tem conscisse videretur et qualis causa M. Pisonis visa esset, cui relationi ad– iecisset, uti precum suarum pro adulescente memor is ordo esset, qualis cau– sa Plancinae visa esset, pro qua persona, quid petisset et quas propter causas,10 exposuisset antea, et quid de Visellio Karo et de Sempronio Basso, comitibus Cn. Pisonis patris, iudicaret senatus, d(e) i(is) r(ebus) i(ta) c(ensuerunt). vacat senatum populumq(ue) Romanum ante omnia dis immortalibus gratias agere, [End Page 14]1 December 10, on the Palatine in the portico adjacent to the Temple of Apollo. Present at the writing were M. Valerius M.f. Messallinus from the voting tribe Lemonia, C. Ateius L. f. Capito from the voting tribe Aniensis, Sex. Pompeius Sex. f. from the voting tribe Arnensis, M. Pompeius M. f. Priscus from the voting tribe Teretina, C. Arrenus C. f. Gallus from the voting tribe Galeria; L. Nonius L. f. Asprenas from the voting tribe Pomptina, quaestor, M. Vinicius P. f. from the voting tribe Poblilia, quaestor.WHEREAS Ti. Caesar Augustus, son of the deified Augustus, 5 pontifex maxumus,> in the twenty–second year of his tribunician power, having been consul three times, consul–designate for the fourth time, referred to the Senate for decision:how the case of the elder Cn. Piso had seemed and whether he seemed to have taken his life with due cause, andhow the case of M. Piso had seemed (to which item he had added that the senators be mindful of his entreaties on behalf of the young man); how the case of Plancina had seemed (for which person 10 he had previously explained what he sought and for what reasons), andwhat the Senate's judgment was concerning Visellius Karus and Sempronius Bassus, members of the elder Cn. Piso's staff,Concerning These Matters they Decreed as Follows:THAT the Senate and Roman people, before all else, expressed gratitude to the immortal gods because they did [End Page 15]quod nefaris consilis Cn. Pisonis patris tranquillitatem praesentis status r(ei) p(ublicae), quo melior optari non pote [e]t quo beneficio principis nostri frui contigit,15 turbar[i] passi non sunt, deinde Ti. Caesari Augusto principi suo quod earum rerum omnium, quae ad explorandam veritatem necessariae fuerunt, co– piam senatui fecerit, cuius aequitatem et patientiam hoc quoq(ue) nomine admirari senatum, quod, cum manufestissuma sint Cn. Pisonis patris scelera et ipse de se supplicium sumpsisset, nihilominus causam eius cognosci volue–20 rit filiosque eius arcessitos hortatus sit, ut patris sui causam defenderent, ita ut eum quoq(ue), qui ordinis senatori nondum esset, ob eam rem introduci in senatum vellet et copiam utriq(ue) dicendi pro patre et pro matre ipsorum et pro M. Pisone faceret. Itaque cum per aliquot dies acta causa sit ab accusatoribus Cn. Pisonis patris et ab ipso Cn. Pisone patre, recitatae epistulae, recitata exemplaria codicillorum, quos25 Germanicus Caesar Cn. Pisoni patri scripsisset, producti testes cuiusq(ue) ordinis sint, [End Page 16]not allow the tranquility of the present state of the republic... (shrink)

IN a letter to the Editor of MIND, Mr. G. T. Bennett of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, points out a stupid slip which I made on page 499 of MIND, N.S., No. 124. In illustrating Mr. Johnson's analysis of the subsumptive syllogism in my review of his Logic, Part II., I took as a major premise the proposition “Everything with sides and angles is equiangular, if equilateral”. This is, of course, ridiculously false, as Mr. Bennett points out. A figure made (...) of four equal jointed rods could be pushed into many different shapes. I want to make it quite clear that this is a slip.of my own, and that nothing of the kind occurs in Mr. Johnson's book. Of course, for purposes of illustration, it is a matter of indifference whether we choose false propositions or true ones, so that no injustice has been done to Mr. Johnson's theory. But I am not going to pretend that I did not think this proposition to be true at the moment when I wrote it down. I am sorry to have been so careless, and I should be still more sorry if anyone should have ascribed the carelessness to Mr. Johnson himself and not to his reviewer. I must thank Mr. Bennett for pointing out the mistake. (shrink)

Les livres qui proposent, en littérature, des lectures phénoménologiques et, en phénoménologie, des lectures littéraires, comme ceux qui, plus généralement en philosophie, engagent des phénoménologies de la littérature ou de l'œuvre littéraire sont aussi nombreux que ceux qui interrogent la phénoménologie et la littérature, ou la littérature et la phénoménologie. Ce volume, unique en son genre, a pris une option très spécifique, qui est une sorte de perspectivisme : interroger la position d'entre-deux du phénoménologue et, à travers lui en sa (...) fonction de 'décrivant', la posture de la phénoménologie entre - voire à l'intersection de - la philosophie et la littérature. À cette dimension concernant la matière et la méthode de la démarche, il s'en ajoute toutefois une autre : ce livre est le fruit d'une collaboration internationale, entre des phénoménologues belges, français et péruviens qui tous ont œuvré pour que la phénoménologie use de ses lettres de noblesse dans le champ des littératures. Et ils le font dans le cadre d'une démarche interdisciplinaire car ils sollicitent les apports des neurosciences, de l'herméneutique, des arts tels la peinture, le cinéma ou encore la poésie, mais aussi les enjeux de réflexion éthique. Avec ce volume, riche par sa diversité et par sa portée interculturelle, ce sont en trois universités qui portent un projet rigoureusement collaboratif : l'UC Louvain de Louvain-la-Neuve, en Belgique, l'Universidad del Pacífico et la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú de Lima, au Pérou. Par conséquent, il est aussi évident que ces rapports entre phénoménologie et littérature se disent linguistiquement au carrefour des cultures francophone, hispanophone et aussi anglophone."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Contingencies of the early nuclear arms race Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-23 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9495-z Authors S. S. Schweber, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Science Center 371, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Alex Wellerstein, Department of the History of Science, Harvard University, Science Center 371, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Ethan Pollock, Department of History, Box N, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Barton J. Bernstein, History Department, Building 200, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-2024, USA Michael D. Gordin, History (...) Department, 305 Dickinson Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

Equity was first established as a terminus technicus by Aristotle, but the word was initially shaped by Plato in his Statesman. Aristotle considers equity as a necessary criterion of the interpretation of human action, i.e., the ultimate, the particular moral situation, given that law is general, and every moral agent makes different moral choices, since man exhibits a multiplicity of purposes as a being and every person acts on the basis of a variety of moral perspectives and values. Therefore, the (...) task of every judge is to trace the moral choice made by a moral agent, as well as to interpret the law and attribute justice, since, as it is attested, law may be deficient, whereas this does not necessarily apply to justice itself. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Books ReceivedThe Ambitions of Curiosity: Understanding the World in Ancient Greece and China. By G.E.R. Lloyd. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi + 175. Price not given.The Art of the Han Essay: Wang Fu's Ch'ien-Fu Lun. By Anne Behnke Kinney. Tempe: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1990. Pp. xi + 154. Paper $10.00.The Autobiography of Jamgön Kongtrul: A Gem of Many Colors. By Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrön (...) Thayé and translated by Richard Barron (Chökyi Nyima). Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2003. Pp. xxii + 549. Price not given.Awesome Nightfall: The Life, Times, and Poetry of Saigyō. By William R. LaFleur. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. xiii + 173. Paper $14.95.Becoming the Compassion Buddha: Tantric Mahamudra for Everyday Life. By Lama Thubten Yeshe, edited by Robina Courtin, and foreword by Geshe Lhundub Sopa. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. xi + 194. Paper $14.95.Between Two Worlds East and West: An Autobiography. By J. N. Mohanty. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 134. Hardcover RS 525.00.The Chinese Face of Jesus Christ. Edited by Roman Malek, S.V.D. Sankt Augustin, Germany: Institut Monumenta Serica and China-Zentrum; and Nettetal, Germany: Steyler Verlag, 2002. Pp. 391. EUR 40.00.Chinese Medicine in Contemporary China: Plurality and Synthesis. By Volker Scheid. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv + 407. Hardcover $69.95. Paper $23.95.Confucian Feminist: Memoirs of Zeng Baosun (1893-1978). Translated and adapted by Thomas L. Kennedy. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 2002. Pp. xxi + 170. Price not given.Consciousness Studies: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. By K. Ramakrishna Rao. Jefferson (North Carolina) and London: McFarland and Company, 2002. Pp. 367. Hardcover $65.00.Constituting Communities: Theravāda Buddhism and the Religious Cultures of South and Southeast Asia. Edited by John Clifford Holt, Jacob N. Kinnard, and Jonathan S. Walters. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 224. Hardcover $65.50. Paper $21.95.Developments in Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards: Classical and Western. By Daya Krishna. Volume X Part 1 of History of Science, Philosophy and Culture in Indian Civilization, edited by D. P. Chattopadhyaya. New [End Page 110] Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2001. Pp. xxiii + 417. Hardcover RS 1200.East and West: Identità e dialogo interculturale. By Giangiorgio Pasqualotto. Venezia: Marsilo Editori, 2003. Pp. 210. EUR 16.00.Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China. By Edward Slingerland. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 352. Price not given.Encountering Kā lī: In the Margins, at the Center, in the West. Edited by Rachel Fell McDermott and Jeffrey J. Kripal. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. xviii + 321. Hardcover $55.00, £37.95. Paper $21.95, £15.95.Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy. Edited by Antonio S. Cua. New York and London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. xx + 1020. Hardcover $150.00.Essays on Indian Philosophy. By J. N. Mohanty and edited by Purushottama Bilimoria. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xxxvii + 347. Paper RS 525.00.Faith, Humor, and Paradox. By Ignacio L. Götz. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002. Pp. 136. Hardcover $61.95.Four Illusions: Candrakīrti's Advice for Travelers on the Bodhisattva Path. Translated by Karen C. Lang. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xv + 240. Price not given.The Great Awakening: A Buddhist Social Theory. By David R. Loy. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. 223. Paper $16.95.The Hidden History of The Tibetan Book of the Dead. By Bryan J. Cuevas. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 328. Price not given.Huang Di nei jing su wen: Nature, Knowledge, Imagery in an Ancient Chinese Medical Text. By Paul U. Unschuld. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003. Pp. xii + 520. Hardcover $75.00, £52.00.In Dewey's Wake: Unfinished Work of Pragmatic Reconstruction. Edited by William J. Gavin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Pp. vi + 249. Hardcover $71.50. Paper $23.95.Knowledge and Freedom in Indian Philosophy. By Tara Chatterjea. Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2002. Pp. xvi + 159. Hardcover... (shrink)